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FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE 
Sandy L. Zabell, Ph.D.* 
I. FINGERPRINTS REVISITED? 
Recent years have seen an increasing number of challenges to 
fingerprint evidence.1 Given its long standing as the “gold 
standard” of human identification, this may seem surprising, but 
there are, in fact, several natural reasons for this unexpected 
development. The first and most important of these is undoubtedly 
the spectacular rise to prominence of DNA technologies in the 
forensic arena. DNA identification has not only transformed and 
revolutionized forensic science, it has also created a new set of 
standards that have raised expectations for forensic science in 
general.2 Traditional areas of criminalistics that have large 
                                                 
 * Professor of Mathematics and Statistics at Northwestern University. I am 
grateful to Simon Cole for generously sharing his extensive knowledge of this 
subject, and for providing many helpful references and comments. Thanks also 
to Margaret Berger, David Kaye, Gregory O’Reilly for helpful comments on an 
initial draft of the manuscript, and Matthew Tulchin for editorial assistance.  
1 See U.S. v. Navarro-Fletes, No. 01-30247, 2002 WL 31420123, at *1-2 
(9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2002) (ruling that the district court did not err in admitting 
fingerprint testimony); U.S. v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
that latent fingerprint identification satisfies Daubert); U.S. v. Salim, 189 F. 
Supp. 2d 93, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that the methodology undertaken by 
the government’s fingerprint witness met the Daubert standard); U.S. v. Llera 
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (discussing whether the FBI’s 
fingerprint identification technique satisfied Daubert). 
2 See National Institute of Justice Investigative and Forensic Sciences, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/sciencetech/ifs.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004). 
The Institute states: “The success achieved by DNA evidence in the criminal 
justice system has raised the bar for all forensic disciplines. The criminal justice 
community, as well as the general public, now carries the same high 
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subjective and judgmental components, such as bite mark analysis, 
are now subject to much greater skepticism and more searching 
scrutiny.3 
Even given these new expectations, however, how can 
fingerprint analysis, so long the paradigm for human identification 
and so apparently simple in concept, be subject to serious 
question? The answer to this apparent paradox lies in recognizing 
the distinction between a latent print (one taken from a crime 
scene), and a rolled or inked print (a print taken under controlled 
conditions, such as at a police station). Latent prints may exhibit 
only a small portion of the surface of the finger and may be 
smudged, distorted, or both, depending on how they were 
deposited. For these reasons, latent prints are an “inevitable source 
of error in making comparisons,” as they generally “contain less 
clarity, less content, and less undistorted information than a 
fingerprint taken under controlled conditions, and much, much less 
detail compared to the actual patterns of ridges and grooves of a 
finger.”4 (See Figure 1). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
expectations for all forensic evidence.” Id. 
3 See Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, From the Start, A Faulty Science, 
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2004, at A1. David Faigman, a Professor at the University 
of California Hastings College of the Law and co-editor of Modern Scientific 
Evidence, remarks, “I think bite marks probably ought to be the poster child for 
bad forensic science.” Id. 
4 Lyn Haber & Ralph N. Haber, Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint 
Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 341 (Nalini 
Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004). 
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Figure 1: Fingerprint Comparisons5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Alex Garcia; Chicago Tribune              Alex Garcia; Chicago Tribune 
       Fig. 1(a) – Inked print                                Fig. 1(b) – Latent print said to                                                                              
       of Richard Jackson                                     match the print in Fig. 1(a) 
                                                                            
Another important reason for the increased scrutiny of 
fingerprint evidence is the increasing number of documented 
misidentifications based on fingerprint analysis.6 Such 
misidentifications are of interest for several reasons: they illustrate 
the subjective nature of fingerprint evidence; they directly 
contradict a number of claims advanced by the fingerprint 
profession; and they provide concrete illustrations of just what can 
go wrong. 
                                                 
5 Images appear courtesy of the Chicago Tribune. The photographs were 
taken by Alex Garcia and originally appeared in Flynn McRoberts et al., 
Forensics Under the Microscope: Unproven Techniques Sway Courts, Erode 
Justice, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2004, at A1. 
6 See infra Part II; McRoberts et al., supra note 5; Simon Cole, The Myth of 
Fingerprints, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 6 (Magazine) at 13. 
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II. FINGERPRINT MISIDENTIFICATIONS: TWO CASE STUDIES 
A. Commonwealth v. Cowans7 
On May 30, 1997, an African-American male shot and 
wounded Officer Gregory Gallagher of the Boston Police 
Department while that officer was on duty.8 The assailant’s 
baseball hat fell off during the initial struggle between the two 
men.9 Shortly after the shooting, an African-American male 
holding a gun gained entry into the nearby residence of Ms. Bonnie 
Lacy.10 The individual removed his sweatshirt, wiped his gun off, 
asked for and received a glass of water, and then left.11 
Officer Gallagher later identified Mr. Stephan Cowans as his 
assailant in a photographic lineup that included the pictures of 
eight individuals.12 The officer also subsequently identified 
Cowans in a standard lineup that included the suspect.13 A witness 
who saw the presumed assailant shortly after the shooting 
confirmed the identification, although Ms. Lacy did not.14 In 
addition to the eyewitness evidence, investigators located a 
fingerprint on the glass used by the individual who had gained 
entry to Ms. Lacy’s house.15 The print was matched to that of Mr. 
Cowans by two fingerprint examiners working for the Boston 
Police Department.16 A fingerprint examiner retained by the 
                                                 
7 Commonwealth v. Cowans, 756 N.E.2d 622 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) 
8 Id. at 624. 
9 Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Sets Bail in DNA Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
22, 2004, at B4. 
10 Cowans, 756 N.E.2d at 625. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Sets Bail in DNA Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
22, 2004, at B4. See also Jonathan Saltzman & Mac Daniel, Man Freed in 1997 
Shooting of Officer Judge Gives Ruling After Fingerprint Revelation, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2004, at A1. 
16 Jack Thomas, 2 Police Officers Are Put On Leave, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
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defense later confirmed the fingerprint match.17 On the basis of 
this evidence, Mr. Cowans was convicted of shooting a police 
officer and sentenced to thirty to forty-five years in state prison.18 
In the pre-DNA world, Mr. Cowans would no doubt have spent 
much of his adult life behind bars. However, in May 2003 (six 
years after Cowans’s conviction), at the defendant’s request, 
Orchid Cellmark Laboratories performed DNA testing on both the 
glass and the baseball hat found at the crime scene.19 The DNA 
profile found on the glass did not match that of Mr. Cowans, but it 
did match that of the primary contributor to the DNA on the 
baseball cap.20 
In January 2004, at the request of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, further testing was performed on the sweatshirt. 
The resulting DNA profile matched the common profile found on 
the glass and the baseball hat.21 Initially, Suffolk Assistant District 
Attorney David E. Meier stated that, given the “compelling” 
evidence of the fingerprint on the glass, his office would retry 
Cowans if the conviction were overturned.22 Two days later, after 
the fingerprint had been re-examined, however, Meier changed his 
mind.23 In addressing Superior Court Judge Peter Lauriat, Meier 
explained that the fingerprint evidence presented at trial did not 
match that of Cowans: “I can conclusively and unequivocally state, 
your honor, that that purported match was a mistake.”24 Mr. 
Cowans was then released, having spent six years in jail for a 
                                                 
24, 2004, at B1 (stating that two fingerprint technicians “testified that a 
fingerprint lifted from a glass used by the assailant matched Cowans’s print”). 
17 Interview with James Dilday, Partner, Grayer & Dilday (Apr. 19, 2004). 
18 See Saltzman & Daniel, supra note 15. 
19 Id. 
20 The cap contained a mixture of two or more sources of DNA, but none of 
these could have originated with Mr. Cowans. See Saltzman, supra note 9. 
21 Jack Thomas, ‘I Was Not the Man Who Did This’ Cleared of Shooting 
Charge, Stephan Cowans Looks Back at Six Years Lost in Prison, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 28, 2004, at F1. See also The Innocence Project, Stephen Cowans 
Case Profile, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display-
_profile.php?id=141 (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). 
22 Saltzman, supra note 9. 
23 Id. 
24 Saltzman & Daniel, supra note 15. 
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crime he did not commit.25 
B. The Mayfield Affair 
On March 11, 2004, a terrorist bomb attack on a Madrid train 
station resulted in 191 deaths and some 2,000 people injured.26 The 
Spanish authorities found a bag of detonators near the site of the 
explosion with a fingerprint on it that did not match any in their 
databank.27 The authorities forwarded the print to several 
investigative organizations, including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). After searching its fingerprint database, the 
FBI located a possible match in the prints of Mr. Brandon 
Mayfield, an attorney in Portland, Oregon.28 
From the start, there were troubling aspects about the match. 
Mr. Mayfield had ties to Muslim individuals and organizations 
thought to make him suspect, but there was no evidence that he 
had been out of the country for many years.29 Nevertheless, the 
FBI examiners concluded that the print was a “100 percent positive 
identification,” and so informed the Spanish authorities on April 2, 
2004.30 
The Spanish disagreed. On April 13, 2004, the Spanish 
authorities reported in a memorandum to the FBI that the match 
was “conclusively negative.”31 Where the FBI found fifteen points 
of agreement for the fingerprint, the Spanish found only seven.32 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 See Elaine Sciolino, Ten Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1. 
27 Susan Schmidt & Blaine Harden, Lawyer’s Fingerprint Linked to 
Bombing Bag, Detonators Found in Stolen Van in Spain, WASH. POST, May 8, 
2004, at A3. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint 
Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 706, 710. 
31 Sarah Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at A1. 
32 Id. 
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Nevertheless, the FBI continued to maintain that the latent print on 
the bag matched that of Mr. Mayfield and arranged a meeting with 
Spanish officials in Madrid on April 21, 2004 to present their 
analysis. The meeting did nothing to change the opinion of the FBI 
and, subsequently, Mr. Mayfield was arrested on May 6, 2004 on a 
material witness warrant.33 
Fortunately for Mr. Mayfield, the Spanish authorities persisted 
with their investigation and, shortly after Mayfield’s arrest, 
announced that they had matched the latent print to an Algerian 
named Ouhnane Daoud.34 The final blow came when the Spanish 
authorities “found traces of Daoud’s DNA in a rural cottage 
outside Madrid where investigators believe the terrorist cell held 
planning sessions and assembled the backpack bombs used in the 
attack.”35 Mr. Mayfield was finally released after spending two 
weeks in jail.36 
What went wrong? FBI officials initially gave conflicting 
accounts. In June 2004, The New York Times reported on the 
agency’s changing positions: 
F.B.I. officials told Congress members in the briefings last 
week that they had come up with the match after working 
off a ‘second-generation’ digital print—meaning a copy of 
a copy. But they gave a somewhat different explanation in 
interviews this week, saying they were now uncertain what 
generation the digital print represented. But the F.B.I. 
official who spoke to The New York Times on condition of 
anonymity added that the real issue was the quality of the 
latent print that the Spaniards originally took from the blue 
bag. 
The determination by an F.B.I. examiner that the print was 
useable was hasty and erroneous, F.B.I. officials said, and 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Susan Schmidt, Oregon Lawyer’s Status Remains Murky, WASH. POST, 
May 22, 2004, at A2. 
35 Tomas Alex Tizon et al., Critics Galvanized by Oregon Lawyer’s Case, 
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A13. 
36 David Heath & Hal Bernton, Portland Lawyer Released in Probe of 
Spain Bombings, SEATTLE TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A1. 
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set the agency off in the wrong direction and corrupted the 
rest of the process. 37 
Neither of these conflicting explanations is satisfactory. Latent 
prints of any type, digitized or not, almost always involve elements 
of distortion and a loss of information; part of an examiner’s 
claimed expertise is the ability to determine precisely when a latent 
is useable, and the FBI, in particular, has extensive experience, 
going back a decade, in the use of digitized prints. 38 The basic rule 
is supposed to be that if there is any doubt regarding the purported 
match, an identification is not reported. Either that did not happen 
in Mayfield, or erroneous identifications are possible, even when 
examiners have (or express) no doubt about the identification. 
Nor is the “quality of the latent print that the Spanish originally 
took” an adequate explanation for the error, given that Spanish 
authorities had no difficulty in determining from the outset that the 
latent did not match Mr. Mayfield’s print. Instead, the explanation 
seems to lie elsewhere. David Ashbaugh, in his highly regarded 
book Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, notes: 
Experienced identification specialists have learned through 
training and practice the limits of how much distortion or 
difference is still considered within the parameters of 
agreement. For the benefit of those who do not have much 
experience, if each area of friction ridge detail being 
compared requires justification for why the formation 
appears slightly different or why it is not spatially correct, 
be cautious, one may be talking oneself into agreement that 
is not really there.39 
It would appear that a situation similar to the one Ashbaugh 
describes occurred in the Mayfield case. 
In responding to the investigative methods used by the FBI in 
the Madrid bombing case, Pedro Luis Melida Lledo, head of the 
                                                 
37 Kershaw, supra note 31, at A1. 
38 See Christopher Brislawn, Fingerprints Go Digital, 42 NOTICES AM. 
MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1278 (1995). 
39 DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE 
ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY 146 
(1999) (emphasis added). 
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Spanish National Police’s fingerprint unit, noted, “They had a 
justification for everything . . . [b]ut I just couldn’t see it.”40 
According to Melida, Mayfield’s print differed from the latent 
found on the blue bag both in that the arcs on the lower portion of 
his print pointed downward rather than upward, as they did in the 
latent, and in the number of concentric rings (or crests) that were 
visible to investigators.41 Melida offered the following analogy for 
what might have happened to the FBI investigators: 
You’re trying to match a woman’s face to a picture . . . 
[b]ut you see that woman has a mole, and the face in the 
picture doesn’t. Well, maybe it’s covered up with make-up, 
you say. O.K., but the woman has straight hair and it’s 
curly in the picture. Maybe the woman in the picture had a 
permanent?42 
Other examples of fingerprint misidentifications are known. 
(The inked and rolled prints in Figure 1, for example, furnish 
another instance.)43 As the Mayfield case illustrates, the process of 
comparing latent and inked prints is inherently subjective and 
subject to error, and an awareness of the perils implicit in such an 
approach is a requisite first step in considering possible remedies. 
Understanding how some of the FBI’s most senior examiners 
could have persuaded themselves that the two prints matched is 
perhaps best achieved, however, in a more general context, to 
which we now turn. 
                                                 
40 Kershaw, supra note 31, at A1. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See Mary Anne Janco, Murder Case is Formally Dropped: Richard 
Jackson’s Fingerprints Did Not Match Those Found at the Scene, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 2000, at B1; Anne Barnard, Convicted in Slaying, Man Wins 
Freedom: An FBI Investigation Found that Fingerprints at Murder Scene Were 
Not Those of Richard Jackson, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 24, 1999, at B1; Mary 
Anne Janco, Release of Convicted Killer is Sought, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 24, 
1999, at B1; Rachel Scheier, New Trial Sought in U. Darby Slaying: A 
Prosecution Fingerprint Expert’s Testimony is in Question, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Aug. 16, 1999, at B1. 
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III. THE NEED FOR SCIENCE 
Because the requirements for scientific rigor are so demanding, 
let us pause briefly to discuss why they exist. Science is not just 
one of several competing, equally valid forms of knowledge. 
Scientific procedures have evolved, and science is accorded great 
respect precisely because it is recognized that one can only obtain 
truly reliable knowledge by using its protocols and practices. 
Suppose that a scientist is testing a particular procedure having 
a claimed effect. For example, consider a case in which a new 
medication or a new surgical procedure claims to be superior to an 
old medication or surgical procedure. There are two important 
elements in the design of a scientifically valid experiment to test 
this. The experiment should employ controls, and the individuals 
or units being tested should be randomly allocated to the treatment 
and control groups. The allocation should be random in order to 
eliminate any possible bias in assigning individuals to the two 
groups. Ideally, the evaluation should also be blind: both the 
evaluator and the subject should not be told whether the subject is 
in the treatment or control group.44 There are many examples in the 
scientific literature illustrating the importance of properly designed 
experiments; the following case is particularly instructive. 
A. The Portacaval Shunt45 
The portacaval shunt was a surgical procedure thought for 
several years to be effective in treating cirrhosis of the liver by 
redirecting blood flow. After many studies in support of the 
procedure had been published in medical journals, Grace, Muench, 
and Chalmers published a review of the studies.46 Their analysis 
examined the structure of fifty-one portacaval shunt studies and the 
conclusions reported in each paper regarding the shunt’s 
                                                 
44 The nature of the evaluation may make blinding impossible, however. 
45 See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 8-9 (3d ed. 1997). This 
outstanding textbook contains a number of other instructive examples of this 
nature. 
46 N. D. Grace et al., The Present Status of Shunts for Portal Hypertension 
in Cirrhosis, 50 GASTROENTEROLOGY 684 (1966). 
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effectiveness. The results of the fifty-one studies are summarized 
below. 
  
Design of Experiment      Degree of Enthusiasm for Procedure 
 
 Marked Moderate None 
    
No Controls 24 7 1 
 
Nonrandomized controls 
 
10 3 2 
Randomized controls 0 1 3 
 
The results are instructive when enthusiasm for the shunt 
procedure is compared to whether or not the design of the 
experiment employed controls and, if so, which type. It is apparent 
from the table that the procedure has little, if any, value: when 
controls were employed and allocated in a random fashion to 
treatment and control groups, three of the four studies with 
controls found no evidence of the procedure’s effectiveness. Most 
of the studies, however, were poorly designed: thirty-two of the 
fifty-one did not employ controls at all, and fifteen of the nineteen 
that did use controls failed to use randomization to allocate 
subjects to the treatment and control groups. As a result, most of 
the studies got it wrong: 75% of the studies without controls 
expressed marked enthusiasm for the procedure, as did 66% of 
those that employed nonrandomized controls. 
What is going on here? In brief, it is a well-understood 
phenomenon that the human mind often sees what it expects to see, 
hopes to see, or wants to see.47 The reason science requires 
rigorous standards of testing is precisely because strongly held 
beliefs and expert opinions do not always withstand scrutiny or 
comparisons to serious objective competitors. This is not simply a 
case of science versus non-science. In the past, spectacular 
                                                 
47 It should be stressed that this is a separate phenomenon from deliberate 
fraud. In the phenomenon we are discussing, there is deception at work, but it is 
self-deception. 
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examples of nonexistent phenomena, such as N-rays, polywater, 
and cold fusion, have been reported and maintained by many 
investigators until serious peer review revealed the claims to be 
erroneous.48 The failure to follow proper procedures, even or 
especially by scientists, can have serious consequences. 
B. Clinical v. Statistical Prediction 
A related phenomenon is that of clinical versus statistical 
prediction. A classic study performed by Paul Meehl found that the 
predictions of experts based on clinical interviews were often far 
less accurate than predictions based on statistical or actuarial 
instruments.49 Although experts are often more comfortable relying 
on their instincts, this reliance does not always translate into 
superior predictive ability.50 
A related point is the distinction between the scientific uses of 
the terms “reliability” and “validity.” A measurement procedure is 
said to be reliable if, when repeated, it gives rise to the same result. 
It is, in other words, consistent. In contrast, a procedure is said to 
be valid if it measures what it claims to measure. For example, in 
the popular Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification 
(ACE-V) paradigm for fingerprint identification,51 the verification 
stage, in which a second examiner confirms the assessment of the 
original examiner, may increase the consistency of the 
assessments. But while the verification stage has implications for 
the reliability of latent print comparisons, it does not assure their 
validity. 
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Irving Klotz, The N-ray Affair, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 
1980; FELIX FRANKS, POLYWATER (1981); GARY TAUBES, BAD SCIENCE: THE 
SHORT LIFE AND WEIRD TIMES OF COLD FUSION (1983). 
49 PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (Jason Aronson ed., 
Univ. of Minn. Press 1996) (1954). 
50 Anne M. Heinz et al., Sentencing By Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-31 (1976) (discussing the phenomenon in the 
context of parole decisions). 
51 See, ASHBAUGH, supra note 39, at 196. 
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IV.  FINGERPRINT OPINIONS 
Suppose that a latent print and a rolled print are judged to be a 
match by an examiner. Such fingerprint identifications can be 
thought of as implicitly making several assertions based on the 
knowledge and experience of the examiner. First, through an 
identification an examiner suggests that the latent print and the 
rolled prints could have a common source; that is, although no pair 
of latent and rolled prints is ever identical, the examiner concludes 
on the basis of his knowledge and experience that the differences 
between the latent and rolled prints fall within the expected or 
possible range of variation. Second, an identification indicates that 
the latent and rolled prints exhibit a degree of similarity 
substantially greater than one ordinarily sees in pairs of prints 
coming from different individuals. Such a judgment in principle 
also reflects the accumulated knowledge and experience of the 
examiner, even though, in practice, an examiner might not have 
actually seen very many “near misses.” Lastly, the examiner 
asserts that only one person in the world could be the source of the 
latent print. 
This last assertion is problematic because, unlike the first two, 
it is difficult to determine what precise knowledge or experience 
on the part of an examiner could serve as the basis for such a 
conclusion. Ashbaugh describes the process: 
An opinion of individualization is unambiguous. The 
details in both prints are in agreement and, in the opinion of 
the identification specialist, there is sufficient uniqueness 
[sic] present in the friction ridge detail to eliminate all other 
possible donors. This opinion is subjective and it is based 
on the knowledge and experience of the examiner.52 
There are obvious questions about such an approach. Suppose that 
the fingerprint examiner is wrong and that, rather than there being 
a unique “match,” instead 1 in 1,000,000 persons have fingerprints 
bearing as great a degree of similarity to a particular latent print as 
the particular fingerprint in question. How could an examiner 
distinguish between these two scenarios based on his knowledge 
                                                 
52 Id. at 146. 
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and experience? The world would look basically the same; people 
do not usually see events that happen only 1 in 1,000,000 times. 
How does an investigator, based on personal experience, 
discriminate between 1 in 1,000,000 and zero? The examiners in 
Mayfield thought they knew, but obviously they did not.53 
“How much correspondence between two fingerprints is 
sufficient to conclude that they were both made by the same 
finger?”54 David Stoney, a distinguished expert on fingerprints, 
tells us: 
An adequate answer to [this question] is not currently 
available. The best answer at present to the question ‘How 
much is enough?’ is that this is up to the individual expert 
fingerprint examiner to determine, based on that examiner’s 
training, skill, and experience. Thus we have an ill-defined, 
flexible, and explicitly subjective criterion for establishing 
fingerprint identification . . . . 
Any unbiased, intelligent assessment of fingerprint 
identification practices today reveals that there are, in 
reality, no standards. That is, the amount of correspondence 
in fraction ridge detail that is necessary for a conclusion of 
identity has not been established.55 
A declaration that a fingerprint match has occurred is essentially a 
statistical statement. As the detail available in a latent fingerprint 
increases, fewer and fewer people will have consistent fingerprints: 
first, 1 in 10, then 1 in 1000, and, finally, 1 in 1,000,000. Based on 
intuition, the examiner thinks he knows where to draw the line, but 
the question remains: what is the justification for such a judgment? 
                                                 
53 The advent in recent years of computer-searchable databanks of digitized 
prints may well have played some role here; a match criterion unlikely to 
generate false positives when used by an examiner fifty years ago while 
searching a databank numbering in the tens of thousands might well generate 
false positives when searching a modern database numbering in the tens of 
millions. 
54 David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in 
ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 327, 329 (Henry C. Lee & Robert E. 
Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
55 Id. at 329-30. 
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A. Comparing Identification Techniques: Fingerprints v. DNA 
Analysis 
The scientific process for analyzing DNA stands in contrast to 
the intuitive process for identifying fingerprint matches. A 
comparison of the two techniques is instructive. Consider the 
following steps in the presentation and analysis of both types of 
evidence: 
 
                   DNA                                       Fingerprints 
  
DNA is unique Fingerprints are unique 
Only a portion of genome 
examined 
Latent only a partial print 
Thirteen loci examined Friction ridge detail identified 
Statistical calculation Subjective judgment 
 
Because the totality of each person’s DNA is unique, 
examining the human genome can potentially enable us to identify 
a person. But practical considerations of time and expense limit us 
to examining only a small portion of the genome. Current forensic 
practice usually entails looking at a total of thirteen loci (locations 
on the twenty-three pairs of chromosome found in human cells), 
and the degree of rarity of the resulting DNA profile is 
scientifically determined by means of a statistical population 
genetic calculation. 
There is an obvious parallel between DNA and fingerprint 
analysis—up to a point. It is claimed that fingerprints, the friction 
ridge detail on the surface of the skin, have the theoretical ability 
to uniquely identify a person.56 Unfortunately, however, fingerprint 
examiners are often faced with the Aristotelian reality of a latent 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., FRANCIS GALTON, FINGERPRINTS (1892); STEPHEN M. STIGLER, 
Galton and Identification by Fingerprints, in STATISTICS ON THE TABLE 131-40 
(1999). 
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print rather than the Platonic ideal of a pristine inked print. The 
analysis of latent prints rests on an examination of Galton points of 
comparison (or, more generally, “friction ridge detail”)—the 
fingerprint analogues of the short tandem repeat (STR) loci used in 
modern forensic DNA analysis. It is here that the apparent parallel 
between fingerprint analysis and DNA analysis intersects reality. 
In contrast to the scientifically-based statistical calculations 
performed by a forensic scientist in analyzing DNA profile 
frequencies, each fingerprint examiner renders an opinion as to the 
similarity of friction ridge detail based on his subjective 
judgment.57 
In order to better understand this fundamental difference in the 
two identification procedures, it is important to consider in detail 
the steps involved in each. The next section discusses the statistical 
calculation of DNA profile frequencies and compares the steps in 
that process to the corresponding steps in fingerprint analysis. 
V. COMPUTING DNA PROFILE FREQUENCIES 
Current forensic DNA technology in the United States is 
commonly based on the determination of a thirteen-locus DNA 
profile. A typical example of such a DNA profile is given on the 
next page: 
 
   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 The statistical calculation of a DNA profile involves the multiple steps of 
collecting a database, estimating allele frequencies using the database, testing 
the database for Hardy-Weinberg and linkage equilibrium, using the so-called 
“product rule” to compute a combined profile frequency, using population 
genetic adjustments to correct for possible population substructure, and 
sometimes even attaching confidence limits to the resulting estimate. 
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      Table 1: A Typical Thirteen Locus DNA Profile 
    
                    
                              Locus               Profile 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D3S1358 16, 18 
VWA 15, 20 
FGA 24, 26 
D8S1179 14, 15 
D21S11 28, 30 
D18S51 10, 16 
D5S818 10, 13 
D7S820 11, 11 
D13S317 12, 15 
D16S539 9, 14 
THO1 6, 8 
TPOX 6, 8 
CSF1PO 7, 8 
ZABELL MACRO CORRECTED TUES 3-14-05.DOC 3/15/2005 12:34 PM 
160 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 Forensic scientists determine DNA profiles and profile 
frequencies using a number of steps.58 First, we know through 
research that at various points on the chromosomes, short 
sequences of nucleotides are repeated in tandem, one after another. 
These sequences are known as short tandem repeats (STRs). The 
exact number of repeats varies from one individual to another, but 
is constant for a given person. For example, consider the locus 
designated D3S1358. In this example, we are concerned with the 
DNA on chromosome 3 (hence the “D3”). The DNA profile for an 
individual at this location (or “locus”) might be 16, 18, indicating 
that at one of the many possible locations where short tandem 
repeats occur on chromosome 3, here, at location number 1358, 
one of the chromosomes of the pair contains the repeated sequence 
16 times, and the other, 18 times. The 16 and the 18 are determined 
objectively using computer software that generates an 
electropherogram, a printout that looks somewhat like an EKG and 
exhibits a sequence of peaks. The presence of a peak indicates the 
presence of a repeat of a given size. 
After the DNA profile of interest has been established, a 
previously collected database of DNA profiles is consulted and the 
frequencies of occurrence of the different repeat sizes (or “alleles”) 
in the DNA profile of interest are determined. (The term “allele” 
refers to a possible state of the DNA at a given locus. In the 
example above, the 16 and 18 are two different alleles.) For 
example, in the case of locus D3S1358, an FBI database indicates 
that among 203 Caucasian individuals having a total of 406 alleles, 
the 16 allele occurs 94 times and the 18 allele occurs 66 times. 
Thus, the frequency of the 16 allele among Caucasians in the 
United States is estimated to be 94/406, or 23%, and the frequency 
of the 18 allele is estimated to be 66/406, or 16%. 
The frequency of the joint occurrence of the 16, 18 “genotype” 
is then estimated using a formula that states that the frequency is 
twice the product of the individual allele frequencies (2 x 23% x 
                                                 
58 See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY AND 
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND STR MARKERS 25 (2001); IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. 
WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC 
SCIENTISTS (1998). 
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16%, or approximately 7%).59 The use of this formula is justified 
by a finding that the population is in at least approximate “Hardy-
Weinberg” equilibrium.60 The specifics of “Hardy-Weinberg” 
equilibrium will not be discussed here, but it is important to note 
that the presence or absence of equilibrium, at least approximately, 
is a fact amenable to scientific determination by the use of 
appropriate statistical tests. Because there was some initial 
controversy regarding the forensic use of DNA, the National 
Academy of Sciences, through its operating arm the National 
Research Council (NRC), convened two panels that issued reports 
(one in 1992 and one in 1996) on the subject. One of the key 
findings of the second NRC panel report on forensic DNA is that 
the use of the above product formula (subject to certain caveats 
and population genetic adjustments, depending on the 
circumstances) is scientifically justified.61 
Similarly, in the case of the vWA locus, the 15 allele occurs 
among Caucasians approximately 44/392, or 11% of the time, and 
the 20 allele occurs 4/392, or 1% of the time. Thus, the 15, 20 
profile occurs 2 x 11% x 1% = 0.22% of the time, or 
approximately 1 in every 455 times. 
Finally, the examiner must determine how unusual it is for a 
person to have the overall profile at all thirteen loci. In order to 
compute this, an examiner uses a second product rule that requires 
the multiplication of profile frequencies at each separate locus. For 
example, if an examiner knew only the profiles for D3S1358 and 
vWA, he would multiply the frequencies for both the 16, 18 at 
D3S1358 and the 15, 20 at vWA, that is, 0.22% x 7% = 0.0154%, 
or about 1 in 6500 times. The scientific justification for this 
formula lies in a determination that the population is in “linkage,” 
or gametic, equilibrium. Once again, this fact is amenable to 
scientific determination and the second NRC report concludes that, 
                                                 
59 Twice because there are two possible ways the profile could arise, 
depending on which alleles the mother and the father contribute. Thus, the 
mother could contribute the 16 and the father the 18, or vice versa. 
60 BRUCE S. WEIR, GENETIC DATA ANALYSIS II: METHODS FOR DISCRETE 
POPULATION GENETIC DATA 92-103 (1996). 
61 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA 
EVIDENCE (1996). 
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subject to certain caveats alluded to earlier, the formula’s use is 
scientifically justified.62 
Certain elements of approximation occur in the above 
calculations; for example, profile frequencies are based on 
estimates derived from samples, the populations in question may 
not be in complete equilibrium, and relatives might be possible 
contributors. Adjustments and corrections are available to account 
for all of these possibilities. 
In contrast, the fingerprint examination process enjoys none of 
the statistical qualities of DNA analysis. “Galton points,” or 
elements of friction ridge detail, are not objectively determined 
quantities. For example, as noted above, in the Mayfield case, the 
FBI claimed fifteen matching points, while the Spanish found only 
seven.63 Indeed, as forensic scientists Christophe Champod and Ian 
Evett emphasize, point requirements only provide an illusory form 
of transparency to the identification process.64 This lack of 
objectivity in the determination of points formed an important part 
of the argument in the influential 1996 paper of Evett and Ray 
Williams, a paper that played a key role in leading the United 
Kingdom to eventually abandon its sixteen-point standard.65 
Similarly, there are no analogues in the realm of fingerprint 
evidence to the collection of databases for the purpose of 
computing allele and DNA profile frequencies. Although 
examiners have a general sense of which fingerprint characteristics 
are common and which are rare, the judgments inherent in this 
work are not based on published statistical studies and methods do 
not exist for estimating the rarity of latent prints. Instead, as noted 
by Stoney, the identification process appeals primarily to the 
experience, training, and expertise of the examiner. 
Consider, for example, the following candid admission by 
Robert D. Olson, Sr.: 
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 Kershaw, supra note 31, at A1. 
64 Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to 
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 101-22 (2001). 
65 See Ian W. Evett & Ray L. Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Point 
Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 
49, 49-73 (1996). 
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All training programs for latent print examiners place great 
emphasis on practical experience during the phases of 
instruction regarding the evaluation and comparison of 
latent prints. This emphasis is well founded and has 
considerable merit, but it has been stressed so heavily that 
little written information exists regarding the 
methodologies and procedures for making a comparison of 
two prints. This lack of information has resulted in . . . the 
failure of many persons to recognize the scientific nature of 
latent print identification.66 
The last sentence of the quotation is a contradiction in terms. Olson 
describes a master-apprentice form of mentoring and, whatever 
else such an arrangement might be, it is not science. The failure to 
publish specific “methodologies and procedures” is totally 
antithetical to good scientific practice and renders impossible any 
form of critical external review. 
VI. UNIQUENESS 
It is often asserted that fingerprints are unique. This is really 
asking the wrong question. A comparison to a similar issue in the 
interpretation of DNA evidence is instructive. Before DNA 
evidence is introduced in court, an expert sometimes states that 
every person’s DNA (except that of identical twins) is unique to 
that person. Such a statement is true, but also misleading. The 
current systems used to type DNA, as noted earlier, examine only a 
very small portion of the human genome. It is not the unrealized 
potential of the entire genome, but the statistical calculations 
regarding the small fraction examined that informs us about the 
strength of the evidence. Similarly, the issue in fingerprint 
identification is not whether the surface of the human finger 
theoretically contains enough information to permit unique 
identification, but whether the latent print being used in a specific 
                                                 
66 Robert D. Olson, Sr. & Henry C. Lee, Identification of Latent Prints, in 
ADVANCES OF FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 41-61 (Henry C. Lee & Robert E. 
Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
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case is sufficient to arrive at such a conclusion.67 
Although there is a substantial literature on the uniqueness of 
fingerprints,68 it is surprising how little true scientific support for 
the proposition exists. “From a statistical viewpoint, the scientific 
foundation for fingerprint individuality is incredibly weak.”69 
Several studies have attempted to propose statistical models for 
fingerprint identification. The most recent of these studies is an 
FBI-sponsored study performed by Meagher, Budowle, and Ziesig 
(MBZ).70 In the MBZ study, the digital images of 50,000 
fingerprints were selected and all possible pairwise comparisons 
were made (including the comparison of an image with itself), 
using an unspecified quantitative measure of similarity. In each 
case it was found, not surprisingly, that the image of a fingerprint 
was far more similar to itself than any of the others and the 
probability of a fortuitous match occurring was estimated based on 
the similarity score used by MBZ. The MBZ study concluded: The 
probability of any non-mate fingerprint being identical to any 
                                                 
67 Of course, the answer to the first question is not irrelevant because it tells 
us whether an affirmative answer to the second question is even possible. 
68 See, e.g., Galton, supra note 56; Stoney, supra note 54; David H. Kaye, 
The Non-Science of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073 (2003). 
69 Stoney, supra note 54, at 383. Stoney’s paper provides an outstanding 
and comprehensive review of the existing literature on the uniqueness of 
fingerprints. However, Stoney’s conclusions about the nature of these past 
studies are depressing. Stoney writes: 
Beginning with Galton and extending through Meagher, Budowle, and 
Ziesig, there have been a dozen or so statistical models proposed. These 
vary considerably in their complexity, but in general there has been 
much speculation and little data. Champod’s work is perhaps the 
exception, bringing forth the first realistic means to predict frequencies 
of occurrence of specific combinations of ridge minutiae. 
Id. 
70 For detailed discussions of the MBZ study, see Stoney, supra note 54, at 
378-83; David H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof of the Uniqueness of 
Fingerprints, 71 INT’L STAT. REV. 521 (2003); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering 
Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and 
Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1226–1231 (2004) [hereinafter Cole, 
Grandfathering Evidence]. 
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particular fingerprint is 1/1097 (1 followed by 97 zeroes).71 
This FBI-sponsored study has been justly attacked on several 
grounds. First and foremost, even if one were to compare rolled 
prints rather than latent prints, the appropriate comparison would 
be the degree of similarity between two different prints from the 
same individual versus two prints from different, randomly 
selected individuals. As Professor David Kaye notes: 
[T]he study merely demonstrates the trivial fact that the 
same two-dimensional representation of the surface of a 
finger is far more similar to itself than to such a 
representation of the surface of a finger from any other 
person in the data set. As such it ignores the fact that two 
prints rolled successively from the same individual are not 
identical . . . .72 
Dr. Stoney also criticized the FBI study on similar grounds, noting 
that “[t]here would never be an occasion to compare a single 
fingerprint to itself.”73 
Obviously the more relevant study would have been to 
compare instead distinct pairs of prints coming from 50,000 
different individuals, each individual contributing two prints. This 
could be thought of as modeling a search of the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) database of inked prints 
using the inked print of a suspect whose prints might be in AFIS 
under a different name due to a prior offense. However, the still far 
more informative study would have been to compare latent prints 
to target rolled prints. 
                                                 
71 Stoney, supra note 54, at 379. 
72 Kaye, supra note 68, at 527. David Stoney agrees with Kaye: 
The Meagher, Budowle, and Ziesig experiments do not include 
comparing two different prints of the same finger with each other. All 
actual fingerprint comparisons have this aspect, and every fingerprint 
examiner knows that no two impressions from the same finger are 
exactly alike . . . . 
The model, therefore, makes an extremely elementary, fundamental 
mistake. 
Stoney, supra note 54, at 380-81. 
73 Stoney, supra note 54, at 380-81. 
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In fact, the FBI study did attempt to address the latent versus 
inked print issue by using cropped versions of the inked prints as 
surrogates for latent prints. Once again, this aspect of the FBI 
study has been harshly criticized; the use of a portion of an inked 
print to represent a latent print is totally misleading because latent 
prints in general suffer not only from a loss of information, but 
also distortions in the deposited image.74 In his critique of the FBI 
study, Dr. Stoney explained that it “employed the thoroughly 
discredited practice of using subsets of inked prints to simulate 
latent prints.”75 For this and other reasons, Dr. Stoney concluded 
that the study was deeply flawed and “highly misleading” and 
concluded that “it [was] remarkable that a study with such 
fundamental flaws was presented in court.”76 
Both Professor Kaye and Dr. Stoney are far from alone in their 
harsh criticism of the FBI study. Champod and Evett, for example, 
declared “entirely unsupportable” the study’s conclusion that the 
probability of a random print being identical to a particular 
fingerprint is 1 in 1097, commenting, “The figure of 10-97 
[computed by MBZ] so transcends reality that we are amazed that 
it was admitted into evidence.”77 
Curiously, as Professor Kaye notes, an initial oversight on the 
part of the authors of the MBZ study inadvertently permitted one 
to compare a small number of rolled prints from the same 
individual.78 This was because it turned out that the 50,000 prints 
did not, in fact, all come from 50,000 different individuals; in a 
                                                 
74 This loss of information is due to the fact that only a portion of the finger 
may leave a print. 
75 Stoney, supra note 54, at 382-83. 
76 Id. Stoney elaborates on his criticism: “It was specifically designed to 
“prove the uniqueness” of fingerprints in a Daubert hearing, and incorporates a 
profound ignorance of both forensic science and statistics. Perhaps the most 
remarkable aspect of these experiments is that they continue to be introduced in 
such hearings.” Id. 
77 See Champod & Evett, supra note 64. For statistical aficionados, the 
MBZ calculation makes the absurd assumption that one can accurately calculate 
probabilities more than twenty standard deviations in the tail of an 
approximately normal distribution. 
78 Kaye, supra note 68, at 1079. 
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small number of cases, some of the prints were, in fact, duplicate 
prints taken from the same individual. These duplicate pairs 
(although of course still fairly similar) were sufficiently dissimilar 
to suggest that one might well see comparable pairs of prints 
exhibiting a comparable level of similarity coming from different 
individuals, provided only that a large enough group of prints were 
examined.79 
VII. PROFICIENCY TESTS 
Despite the absence of objective standards, scientific 
validation, and adequate statistical studies, a natural question to 
ask is how well fingerprint examiners actually perform. 
Proficiency tests do not validate a procedure per se, but they can 
provide some insight into error rates. In 1995, the Collaborative 
Testing Service (CTS) administered a proficiency test that, for the 
first time, was “designed, assembled, and reviewed” by the 
International Association for Identification (IAI).80 The results 
were disappointing. Four suspect cards with prints of all ten fingers 
were provided together with seven latents.81 Of 156 people taking 
the test, only 68 (44%) correctly classified all seven latents.82 
Overall, the tests contained a total of 48 incorrect identifications.83 
David Grieve, the editor of the Journal of Forensic Identification, 
describes the reaction of the forensic community to the results of 
the CTS test as ranging from “shock to disbelief,”84 and added: 
Errors of this magnitude within a discipline singularly 
admired and respected for its touted absolute certainty as an 
identification process have produced chilling and mind-
numbing realities. Thirty-four participants, an incredible 
22% of those involved, substituted presumed but false 
                                                 
79 Of course, this depends on the particular type of AFIS software being 
used. 
80 David Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521, 
523 (1996). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 525. 
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certainty for truth. By any measure, this represents a profile 
of practice that is unacceptable and thus demands positive 
action by the entire community.85 
What is striking about these comments is that they do not come 
from a critic of the fingerprint community, but from the editor of 
one of its premier publications.86 
It is important to recognize the limits of the information 
provided by proficiency tests. Properly designed proficiency tests 
may give some sense of the possible magnitude of errors in 
casework on the part of examiners, but they do not provide 
scientific validation for assertions that a pattern is unique in the 
human population. Such tests are most useful when they are 
external and blind, that is, the examiners do not have an interest in 
the outcome of the test and the individuals being examined do not 
know that they are being tested. For precisely the same reasons, if 
a fingerprint match is being verified by a second examiner, the 
second examiner should not know the conclusion of the first 
examiner or other facts about the case that might affect his 
judgment. For example, in the Cowans case, the knowledge that a 
fellow officer had been shot, had an unobstructed view of the 
assailant, and had positively identified the suspect may have 
influenced the judgment of subsequent examiners looking at the 
latent print on the glass. 
VIII.VALIDATION 
The fingerprint community appears to believe that past 
performance provides a form of validation. The community claims 
that fingerprints have been used successfully for a nearly a century 
in the United States and, despite the millions of prints on file with 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 The results of subsequent tests have not been quite as poor in terms of 
erroneous identifications, but still have an error rate in the neighborhood of 
10%. The improvement may reflect additional conservatism on the part of the 
test takers rather than changes in actual practice. For further discussion of 
subsequent tests, see Lyn Haber & Ralph N. Haber, Error Rates for Human 
Latent Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 
SYSTEMS 339-60 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004). 
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the FBI, no matching pair coming from a distinct source is known 
to exist. However, these arguments do not inspire confidence. 
First, it need hardly be said that mere courtroom use does not 
constitute validation. In a case in which there are twenty-five 
witnesses to a shooting and the assailant is pinned to the ground, 
finding a matching print tells us little. The real focus should be on 
errors in cases in which fingerprint evidence played a key or even 
decisive role. A conviction in such a case does not validate the 
identification because the conviction itself was presumably a direct 
result of the fingerprint evidence. 
In the pre-DNA era, finding new evidence to establish that a 
conviction was erroneous was a formidable undertaking. At 
present, however, the use of DNA for purposes of human 
identification has radically altered the playing field. As of June 
2002, DNA testing has resulted in the exoneration of at least 108 
Americans.87 The realization that there is potentially a substantial 
error rate in death penalty convictions, many of these discovered 
because of post-conviction DNA testing, has led to a statewide 
moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois.88 Thus, far from being 
surprising, it was perhaps inevitable that the solid science of 
forensic DNA identification would begin to play a role in 
identifying erroneous fingerprint matches. This was certainly true 
for the Cowans case in Boston and may also have played a role in 
the Mayfield case. 
These two cases may merely be the harbinger of things to 
come. In forensic DNA testing, fingerprint examiners face, for the 
first time, a competing form of evidence that both the public and 
their own colleagues in law enforcement will certainly favor as 
being both more scientifically based and more credible. That being 
said, we still do not know the actual rate of error for fingerprint 
identification in criminal cases. As Donald Kennedy, the editor-in-
                                                 
87 Confidence in Criminal Justice Act of 2002: Hearing on S. 2446 Before 
the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Barry 
Scheck, Co-founder, The Innocence Project, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law), available at 2002 WL 20318239. 
88 Press Release, State of Illinois Governor’s Office, Governor Ryan 
Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review 
Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000) (on file with author). 
ZABELL MACRO CORRECTED TUES 3-14-05.DOC 3/15/2005 12:34 PM 
170 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
chief of Science, notes, “It’s not that fingerprint analysis is 
unreliable [but] . . . that its reliability is unverified by either 
statistical models of fingerprint variation or by consistent data on 
error rates.”89 
The argument that no latent print has ever been found to match 
the rolled print of a different person is similarly misleading 
because no systematic search for such pairs on the entire databank 
of millions of fingerprints has ever been performed. Moreover, the 
Mayfield case arguably provides a counterexample to the claim 
that no two inked prints can match the same latent; the FBI only 
retreated after Spanish authorities identified a superior candidate.90 
The deeply disturbing question is whether Mr. Mayfield would 
have ever been exonerated had the terrorist act taken place in the 
United States, rather than Spain, and had Mr. Daoud’s print not 
been discovered.91 
Unfortunately, current practice can make it difficult to identify 
potentially competing candidates for matches. In one California 
jurisdiction, a match to a latent was found by an AFIS search. The 
software generated ten candidate fingerprints, one of which was 
identified as a match to the latent. However, the information 
regarding the other nine prints was discarded and, it was claimed, 
could not be recovered. Such a procedure prevents independent 
experts from determining whether another print might match as 
well as or better than that of the candidate originally identified. 
Several problems complicate true validation. First and 
foremost, there is the absence of any objective standard. Many 
examiners believe that such standards cannot be achieved and that 
no objective set of criteria can capture the full detail available in a 
fingerprint. Even if true, and the clinical-statistical prediction 
debate seems relevant here, it remains unclear how far one could 
get with objective measures. One possibility is to advocate explicit 
probabilistic measures of rarity. These measures would have the 
                                                 
89 Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Neuroscience and Neuroethics, 302 SCIENCE 
1625, 1625 (2003). 
90 See supra II.B. 
91 It is important to keep in mind that three senior examiners of the FBI and 
an independent outside examiner all signed on to the match. 
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merits of objectivity, transparency, and verifiability.92 Moreover, it 
may be unnecessary to design an automated procedure to extract 
all of the information related to a single fingerprint, given that 
DNA analysis functions successfully with only a very small 
portion of the genetic information available. For example, pattern 
recognition experts Pankanti, Prabhakar, and Jain report: 
Our results show that (1) contrary to the popular belief, 
fingerprint matching is not infallible and leads to some 
false associations, (2) while there is an overwhelming 
amount of discriminatory information present in the 
fingerprints, the strength of the evidence degrades 
drastically with noise in the sensed fingerprint images, (3) 
the performance of the state-of-the-art automatic fingerprint 
matchers is not even close to the theoretical limit, and (4) 
because automatic fingerprint verification systems based on 
minutia use only a part of the discriminatory information 
present in the fingerprints, it may be desirable to explore 
additional complementary representations of fingerprints 
for automatic matching.93 
Modern science has transformed many disciplines; there is no 
reason why the same should not be true for fingerprint 
identification. 
IX. MAYFIELD REVISITED 
The Mayfield case affords important insights into the current 
standards of fingerprint identification in the United States. The 
misidentification that took place cannot be explained away as the 
error of a single incompetent individual, nor can it be rationalized 
as the regrettable product of a substandard laboratory. Nor is it 
surprising that the safeguards employed by the system failed. The 
practice of having additional individuals review a match (the “V” 
in ACE-V) has little value if such a review is not blind. Internal 
                                                 
92 See Champod & Evett, supra note 64. 
93 Sharath Pankanti et al., On the Individuality of Fingerprints, 24 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN ANALYSIS AND MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1010 
(Aug. 2002). 
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review can be superficial and subject to pressure; the use of 
external experts to review a case suffers from the reality that such 
individuals, often retired police examiners themselves, may be 
overawed by the FBI or state and local agencies, and, human 
nature being what it is, in any case predisposed to believe the 
original finding. 
Mayfield also has things to tell us about the scientific status of 
fingerprint examination. The fingerprint profession invariably 
attributes errors in identifications to individuals rather than the 
underlying methodology itself.94 But, given its unavoidable 
subjective component, in latent print examination people are the 
process. 
This can be seen in Mayfield. In mid-June 2004, the FBI 
convened an outside committee of experts to review the FBI’s 
handling of the case; the findings of that committee were 
summarized in a report written by Robert Stacey of the FBI.95 The 
Stacey report states: “The error was a human error and not a 
methodological or technology failure.”96 Such a position is hardly 
credible. This was not, at a minimum, “a human error” (note the 
singular tense), but several errors, on the part of senior FBI 
fingerprint examiner Terry Green (who made the initial 
identification); supervisory FBI fingerprint specialist Michael 
Wieners (the unit chief) and fingerprint examiner John T. Massey 
(a retired FBI examiner who had thirty years of experience), both 
of whom verified the identification; and Kenneth Moses, director 
of Forensic Identification Services of San Francisco, the court-
appointed independent expert.97 
Initially, the FBI sought to lay the blame on the quality of the 
                                                 
94 See SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING 
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001). 
95 Stacey, supra note 30, at 706-18. 
96 Id. at 714. 
97 Id. at 710; See also Ben Jacklet & Todd Murphy, Now Free, Mayfield 
Turns Furious, PORTLAND TRIB., May 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=24535. For the fingerprint 
profession’s general proclivity to distinguish between human and 
methodological errors and attribute all fingerprint misidentifications to the 
former, see generally Cole, Grandfathering Evidence, supra note 70.  
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latent; “Robert Jordan the FBI agent in charge of Oregon . . . said 
the FBI’s initial determination about Mayfield’s fingerprint was 
‘based on an image of substandard quality.’”98 The June committee 
summarily dismissed this: “All of the committee members agree 
that the quality of the images that were used to make the erroneous 
identification was not a factor.”99 
But if it was not the quality of the latent, then what caused the 
misidentification? Here the committee pointed to a phenomenon 
discussed earlier, “confirmation bias,” or “context effect,” that is, 
“the mind-set in which the expectations with which people 
approach a task of observation affects their perceptions and 
interpretations of what they observe.”100 
Unfortunately, it is apparent that the fingerprint community 
only partially recognizes the nature of the problem. In discussing 
possible remedies, the Stacey report states that: 
Procedures that require descriptive documentation . . . and 
blind verification (i.e., previous results unknown to the 
verifier) should be implemented on designated cases . . . . 
The original examiner’s document should be sealed or 
withheld from the verifier. The verifier would then conduct 
his or her examination independently . . . .101 
“Designated cases” are later defined as being “high-profile cases or 
cases with latents of poor quality.”102 It is a positive sign that the 
report recognizes the importance of blind verification, but puzzling 
why it felt this step to be necessary only in “designated cases.” The 
reason appears to be that the report believes the problem in 
Mayfield arose in part because of the “extremely high-profile” 
nature of the case, a circumstance the report alludes to several 
                                                 
98 Spain Bomb Case Tossed, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 25, 2004, at A7. 
99 Stacey, supra note 30, at 718. 
100 Id. at 713. “Context effects” have been discussed in the forensic 
literature before. See, e.g., M. J. Saks et al., Context Effects in Forensic Science: 
A Review and Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory 
Practice in the United States, 43 SCIENCE & JUSTICE 119 (2003), for an excellent 
discussion. 
101 Stacey, supra note 30, at 715 (emphasis added). 
102 Id. at 717. 
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times.103 In fact, there is no reason why all verifications should not 
be blind, and—for the reasons discussed earlier in this paper—
every reason why they should. The potential for bias exists in all 
cases, not just “high-profile” ones. (The high-profile cases are, of 
course, the ones in which misidentifications are most likely to be 
detected.) 
The report asserts, perhaps with this issue in mind, that 
“[l]atent print examiners routinely conduct verifications in which 
they know the previous examiners’ results and yet those results do 
not influence the examiner’s conclusions,” but no evidence for this 
lapidary statement is furnished, and there is no reason to credit 
it.104 
The Stacey report also seems naïve in its prescription for 
dealing with disagreements. It states: 
The verifiers must be willing to oppose any examiner if the 
verifiers do not see the details needed to effect the 
identification decision. The quality assurance program 
should make examiners feel that they can disagree about 
any identification. The examiners should be encouraged to 
step forward, without fear of reprisal, if they disagree. This 
part of the scientific method must be institutionalized.105 
The verifiers should not “feel that they can disagree” because there 
should be nothing for them to either agree or disagree about. 
Blindness is an absolute prerequisite for independent evaluation. 
And if disagreement arises after blind verification, then the matter 
should be referred to a committee of third parties. Expecting, for 
example, a junior verifier to stand up to a senior member of a unit, 
especially in an organization like the FBI, is totally unrealistic. It 
is, in any case, profoundly disturbing that such issues were only 
beginning to be seriously addressed by the FBI in the year 2004.106 
                                                 
103 Id. at 713, 716-17. 
104 Id. 
105 Id at 715. 
106 It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened in the 
Mayfield case if, instead of the Spanish authorities, the FBI had faced a local or 
state group. Indeed, in U.S. v. Mitchell, the FBI asked fifty-three law 
enforcement agencies whether Mr. Mitchell’s fingerprints matched either of two 
latents. U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 223-25 (3d Cir. 2004). Of the thirty-nine 
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There are, finally, two aspects of the Mayfield identification 
that the Stacey report unfortunately does not address. First, there is 
the issue of the discrepancy in the number of matching “points”; 
fifteen in the case of the FBI and seven in the case of the Spanish. 
If there is a zero methodological error rate for analysis and 
comparison, this should not have happened. Second, there is the 
issue of the FBI examiners ignoring the dissenting view of the 
Spanish. The Stacey report remarks dryly only that “this was 
interesting, considering that the identification is filled with 
dissimilarities that were easily observed when a detailed analysis 
of the latent print was conducted.”107 This is a most unsatisfactory 
point at which to leave the matter. No matter how high-profile the 
case, how could four experienced examiners overlook such 
indicia? 
There is at least one plausible explanation. Latent prints can 
suffer from both a loss of detail and distortions in the detail 
present. The process of identification necessarily involves a 
weighing of the amount of agreement in comparing two prints 
against the extent of dissimilarities that may just reflect distortions 
arising from the way in which the latent was deposited. There was 
a considerable amount of agreement between Mr. Mayfield’s print 
and the latent; the Stacey report refers twice to the “power of the 
IAFIS [Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System] 
correlation.”108 The “power of the IAFIS correlation” simply 
means that, among the candidate matching prints generated by 
IAFIS, one of them was so similar to (that is, highly “correlated 
with”) Mayfield’s that the three senior FBI examiners involved in 
the examination concluded that Mayfield had to be the source of 
the latent. This example demonstrates that, when searching tens of 
millions of inked prints, the fingerprint community has no real idea 
of just how close a near miss can be. 
The persistence of both the FBI examiners and the independent 
court-appointed expert in their assessments can be viewed not as 
                                                 
agencies that responded, nine believed that Mr. Mitchell’s prints did not match 
either latent, but most of these agencies retreated from this position when the 
FBI continued to press the matter. Id. 
107 Stacey, supra note 30, at 714. 
108 Id. at 713. 
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the result of an error, in the sense of a departure from some 
unspecified protocol, but as merely reflecting their subjective 
judgment that the strength of the correlation and their ability to 
rationalize the apparent differences present indicated that the two 
prints had a common source. The Spanish obviously had different 
standards. The ability of the review committee to rationalize away 
the differences in findings as due to the high-profile nature of the 
case, rather than being the result of a methodological error, may 
itself reflect a form of “confirmation bias” (recall this is “the mind-
set in which the expectations with which people approach a task of 
observation affects their perceptions and interpretations of what 
they observe”). 
X. DISCUSSION 
“We just did our job and made a mistake . . . . That’s how I 
like to think of it—an honest mistake . . . . I’ll preach 
fingerprints till I die. They’re infallible. I still consider 
myself one of the best in the world.”109 
 
The forensic use of fingerprints is now more than a century 
old.110 Introduced when forensic science was in its infancy, 
fingerprints were subject to only limited scrutiny before being 
generally accepted by the courts.111 
Central to this acceptance appears to be what Simon Cole has 
termed “the fingerprint examiner’s fallacy”—the argument that 
fingerprint identification is valid because “fingerprints are 
unique.”112 This is akin, as Cole notes, to arguing that eyewitness 
identification is dependable on the grounds that the human face is 
unique.113 Identification of any kind involves the extraction and 
                                                 
109  John Massey, referring to the Mayfield misidentification. McRoberts et 
al., supra note 5. The quotation is remarkable: an error was made, the examiner 
considers himself one of the best in the world, but fingerprints are infallible. 
110 COLE, supra note 94. 
111 Id. 
112 Cole, Grandfather Evidence, supra note 97, at 1197–1203. 
113 Id. at 1202. 
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analysis of features; the fundamental issue is not the “uniqueness” 
of the object under scrutiny (be it the human face, the friction ridge 
patterns of the human finger, or the sequence of bases in human 
DNA), but the accuracy of the process used to extract features and 
analyze them. 
One reason for the widespread acceptance of this logical 
fallacy may be the failure to recognize the crucial difference 
between an inked and a latent print. If we think of Figure 1(a), an 
inked print, then the dependability of the process may seem self-
evident; however, the true issue is our ability to extract information 
from the all-too frequent reality of Figure 1(b), the latent print. 
From the start, the fingerprint community has claimed the 
ability, given sufficient detail, to identify the source of a latent to 
the exclusion of all others. For example, examiners have made 
assertions that fingerprints are “infallible,” that an identification is 
“100 percent positive,” and that the “methodological error rate” for 
parts of the process is zero.114 Such claims have no scientific basis, 
a fact now recognized by some members of the profession itself.115 
When fingerprint identification errors have been discovered in the 
past, the fingerprint community has almost invariably attributed 
them to incompetent individuals rather problems or limitations in 
the methodology itself. But there is no “methodology,” apart from 
the individual, in the sense of a universally accepted and objective 
set of protocols that can be applied to a set of prints to establish 
identity of source. Fingerprint proponents, however, often ascribe 
fingerprint identification the status of a science, referring to the 
ACE-V “methodology” as being part of the scientific method. 
                                                 
114 Id. at 1231–32. 
115 Grieve, supra note 80, at 528. Grieve writes: 
[T]his categorical requirement of absolute certainty has no particular 
scientific principle but has evolved from a practice shaped more from 
allegiance to dogma than a foundation in science. Once begun, the 
assumption of absolute certainty as the only possible conclusion has 
been maintained by a system of societal indoctrination, not reason, and 
has achieved such a ritualistic sanctity that even mild suggestions that 
its premise should be re-examined are instantly regarded as acts of 
blasphemy. Whatever this may be, it is not science. 
Id. 
ZABELL MACRO CORRECTED TUES 3-14-05.DOC 3/15/2005 12:34 PM 
178 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
ACE-V is an acronym, not a methodology. It is merely the common 
sense description of what anyone would do if they were examining 
a latent and a candidate source print. All of this is not to say that 
fingerprint examination may not usually get things right. The 
problem is that we have no true idea of the underlying error rate. 
Society and the courts accord science great deference and 
respect. When a scientist testifies in court, he is often viewed as an 
impartial and objective expert reporting the indisputable facts of 
science to us. If a forensic scientist tells us that it is 100% certain 
that an individual was present at a crime scene and has the blood of 
the victim on his clothes, this may be decisive in an otherwise 
tenuous case. This places great responsibility, but also great power, 
in the hands of a witness. 
Today we accord forensic DNA evidence such a role, but it 
was hard earned and is well deserved. If a forensic scientist claims 
that a person is, to a high degree of likelihood, the source of the 
evidentiary DNA found at the crime scene, there is usually a solid 
scientific foundation for such an assertion, ordinarily documented 
in great detail in a case file that can be reviewed by outside 
experts, including individuals other than crime laboratory 
technicians. Each new major advance in the forensic use of DNA is 
accompanied by validation studies and tested in the fire of 
admissibility hearings. “Trust but verify” is the watchword. 
The same cannot be said for fingerprint evidence. Latent print 
examination necessarily contains a large subjective component, 
something that automatically rules out certainty. The ability of the 
human mind to see what it hopes or expects is truly remarkable, 
and this ability flourishes in the absence of stringent safeguards.116 
In the past, the fingerprint community has defended its lack of 
scientific grounding, in part, by appealing to its track record in the 
courts. The importance of Cowans and Mayfield, among other 
things, is that they underscore the shakiness of such an argument. 
                                                 
116 See Michel D. Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of 
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and 
Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002) (providing an excellent review of the 
ability of the human mind to see what it hopes or expects to see). See also EVON 
Z. VOGT & RAY HYMAN, WATER WITCHING, U.S.A. (2d ed. 1979) (offering a 
classic discussion of this phenomenon). 
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Obtaining a conviction does not validate the identification. 
Despite the present unsatisfactory state of affairs, there are 
some obvious remedies. A rigorous system of mandatory, frequent, 
external blind proficiency testing needs to be implemented. 
Second, a mechanism for routine, random, blind audits of latent 
identifications should be established. Third, the government needs 
to fund research into the validity and reliability of fingerprint 
identification, the development of pattern recognition software, 
and the quantification of the uncertainty inherent in latent print 
identifications. 
Finally, the courts have a role to play as well. Limits should be 
placed on the testimony of fingerprint examiners (“100 percent 
positive identification”), so that their testimony reflects the true 
limits of their expertise. “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must remain silent.”117 
                                                 
117 “Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss Mann schweigen.” 
(The concluding sentence of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICUS (1921)). 
